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This chapter deals with the relationship between scientific research, government 
regulation and public perceptions of risk. Two issues that have had a significant 
public profile and engendered vigorous debate will be discussed to show how 
the specific dimensions of these varied approaches to the perception of risk 
unfold. The two issues chosen to illustrate the contradictory and positioned 
nature of analytical approaches and risk evaluations used by the government, 
science institutions and the public are dioxin contamination of the environment and 
its subsequent contested health effects, and conventional versus organic food 
production and the relationship between these production methods and the 
consumption of pesticide residues by the general public (once again as an issue 
concerning public perceptions of health). In each case, scientific research will be 
discussed to show important ways the science informing wider debates on these 
topics is a contested field. 
Given the publicly articulated community concerns around these issues, 
the evidence base from which scientific research on dioxin and chemical residues in 
food has been drawn is surprisingly narrow and resides largely within the 
domain of toxicology (the science of poisons) and epidemiology (the study of 
the patterns of diseases in populations). Even within such a narrow specialty 
base it will be seen that there are significant disagreements between participating 
scientists as to what constitutes proof of toxicity and adverse health effects. 
Such varied findings by the relevant 'experts' demonstrate the impact on 
scientific research of commercial and governmental interests — a specific framing 
of the parameters of scientific enquiry which I refer to as 'spin'. 
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In each case study, in addition to discussing the contested nature of the 
science informing regulatory responses to perceived risks, attention will be 
given to how the public exercise their democratic right to participate in 
decision-making. This involves access to information, spin, health concerns 
and trust, as well as the role played by government in informing the 
public and in regulating toxic chemicals. 
The Dioxin Issue 
Dioxin is the name for a group of 210 Individual, structurally similar chemicals' 
(Wright, Millichamp, and Buckland, 2001), the most toxic of which is 2, 3, 7, 
8-TCDD – or TCDD for short. It has been suggested that the dioxin group of 
chemicals forms the most toxic group of substances known to humans, ranking 
alongside plutonium (Williams, 2001). It causes cancer in humans and was 
classified in 1997 by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as a 
known human carcinogen, as well as the cause of many other health problems. 
For instance, dioxin is also an endocrine disrupter – it interferes with the 
chemical messaging systems that control the biological development of animals 
(Myers, 2002). Dioxin "affects cells by interfering with the expression (the 
turning on and off) of genes, which are responsible for making specific proteins" 
(Centre for Health, Environment and Justice [CHEJI 1999: 38). When dioxin 
enters a cell, that cell's gene function is altered. This results in the gene 
expression being blocked, or being kept turned ‘on' inappropriately. The result 
may be a range of defects in normal cell growth, including cancer, birth defects, 
suppression of the immune system and change in normal hormonal levels. 
Exactly how dioxin interferes with gene expression is only partially understood 
(CHEJ, 1999). It has been claimed that there is no safe level of dioxin (The 
New Zealand Herald, 16 February 2001). Even so, as the chapter illustrates, 
there is still much to be learned about its effects on human health. 
Dioxin is fat soluble and bioaccumulates as it goes up the food chain. It is 
aquaphobic, so will move from water into fish: "dioxin levels in fish are 100,000 
times that of the surrounding environment" (Enviroweb, 2000). Dioxin breaks 
down very slowly. On surface soil, it may take 9-15 years to degrade half the 
dioxin in the top 0.1 centimeters and 25-100 years to degrade half the dioxin in 
the subsurface soil below 0.1cm (CHEJ, 1999: 13). In humans, the body excretes 
dioxin by first metabolising it into less harmful and water soluble compounds in the 
liver, but this takes a long time. The half-life for dioxin elimination in humans 
ranges from 5.8 to 14.1 years (CHEJ, 1999: 37). Because of these unique 
characteristics dioxin has become a local, national and global problem. 
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The New Zealand Government Dioxin Action Plan 
Although there is still some scientific dispute over the toxicity of dioxin 
(Montague, 1999), mainly due to the difficulty of providing epidemiological 
and toxicological evidence and of deciding what constitutes proof of toxicity, 
the scientific consensus is that it is extremely toxic. This has led to many 
countries, including New Zealand, signing the Stockholm Convention banning 
the 'dirty dozen' persistent organic pollutants (POPS), including the group of 
chemicals known as dioxin. 
This signing was also the result of public concern about the effects of dioxin 
on human health and the environment. This was expressed by non-governmental 
organisations such as Greenpeace which continued to maintain pressure on 
the government to sign the Stockholm Convention and fight dioxin 
contamination in New Zealand (Greenpeace, 2002). Television programmes 
and newspapers carried stories concerning dioxin contamination (particularly 
over the case of Paritutu discussed below). Pressure was also applied by groups 
located at sites in New Zealand where dioxin was being produced. For some 
time residents surrounding these sites had been agitating for the Government 
to do something about the perceived elevation of their health problems. Yet the 
scientific investigations of these concerns had always claimed that there was 
no such problem (we shall consider this in more detail when we look at the 
Ivan Watkins Dow issue discussed below). 
In addition, information was being reported in the media that the toxicity 
of dioxin was far higher than at first thought. In 1990 the World Health 
Organisation (Smith and Lopipero, 2001: 61) recommended a daily intake of 
no more than 10 picograms per kilogram of body weight (a picogram is a 
million, millionth of a gram). By 1999 that figure was down to 1-4 picograms 
(Smith and Lopipero, 2001: 62), and in 2001, in a The New Zealand Herald 
report section entitled 'Can there be a "safe" level for dioxins?' (The New 
Zealand Herald, 16 February 2001), it was reported that the "US Environmental 
Protection Agency believes the figure should be 10 times lower than even that 
figure" (Smith and Lopipero, 2001). The subject of dioxin toxicity had moved 
out of the realm of experts into the public arena. The newspaper article stated 
that no other chemical causes the cancer risk to escalate so rapidly – clearly 
the Government was under pressure to act. 
In 2000 the New Zealand Ministry for the Environment (MfE) 
commissioned a report on dioxins in New Zealand that was finally published 
on 20 February 2001 (Smith and Lopipero, 2001). The report appears to 
have been made public only after details of its very worrying results were 
leaked to the press on 15 February 2001, contributing to the increase in New 
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Zealand media interest in the topic. 'Dioxin's fatal toll in secret report', 
declared The New Zealand Herald, and went on to point out that the report 
the Government had been sitting on suggested that up to 50 cancer deaths 
each year were due to the high exposure of New Zealanders to dioxin. The 
report noted that "New Zealanders" dietary intake of dioxin is 70 times above 
the daily limit recommended by the US Environmental Protection Agency" 
(The New Zealand Herald, 13 March 2001). The Herald also indicated that 
"Environment Minister Marion Hobbs and her officials warned colleagues 
that its release 'will need to be managed carefully ... to avoid any public 
The spin began the very next day. An MfE senior policy analyst said the 
levels of dioxin in New Zealand were generally lower than those of many 
other countries (The New Zealand Herald, 15 February 2001). Other documents 
from the MfE reiterated how low our levels of dioxin were compared to Europe 
and North America. The MfE Action Plan (MfE, 2001) compares New Zealand 
and other countries based on two methods of assessing dioxin exposure for the 
general population. The first measures the dioxin levels in food, and the second 
measures the concentrations of dioxin in blood. The first  method shows that 
the current dioxin intake for New Zealanders is approximately 0.5pg/kg bw/ 
day. They state that "the dioxin intake of people in industrialised northern 
hemisphere countries is between two and five times as great" (MfE, 2001:11). 
The second method shows that the average exposure has been three times higher 
at 1.4pgfkw bw/day. This exposure is again less than in industrialised northern 
hemisphere countries, but at 1.4pg/kg bw/day is still "close to the WHO tolerable 
daily intake" (MfE, 2001:12). Smith and Lopipero also point out that given 
the average intake of 1.4 pg/kw bw/day, "about half the population would 
have exceeded this intake" (2001:v), 
While the claim about our lower level of dioxin contamination in relation to 
other countries is true, this does not reduce the seriousness of the report's 
findings. It can be argued that 50 deaths a year from cancer is the trade-off for 
the benefits of products such as pesticides and plastics, but, as the 
Government-commissioned report points out, this cancer estimate is 100 times 
higher than the level at which the Government regulates carcinogenic 
exposure from environmental sources (Smith and Lopipero, 2001). It 
would seem that international, national and local concerns about dioxin, and 
the increasing scientific information concerning its toxicity, suggested that the 
Government move to at least regulate dioxin production. According to the local 
newspapers, the dioxin crisis had arrived, and while New Zealand may not 
have had vast `smoke stack' industries producing dioxin, "our agricultural economy 
and 
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enthusiasm for chemicals have in many ways made up for that" (The New 
Zealand Herald, 24 February 2001). 
In May 2001 New Zealand signed the Stockholm Convention, and in so 
doing was required to come up with an action plan to eliminate dioxin. The 
draft action plan was released for public submissions in October 2001 and 
according to a senior policy analyst for MfE, received 124 submissions (S. 
Buckland, personal communication 14 February 2002). The action plan only 
addressed discharges of dioxin to air – further action plans will address the 
other forms of discharge – and aimed to reduce the discharges by developing a 
National Environmental Standard (NES). The action plan points out that a 
NES limiting dioxin discharges "is seen as taking a preventative and 
precautionary approach" (MfE, 2001:viii). But what is meant by a precautionary 
approach? 
The Precautionary Principle (PP) 
`Precaution' is now becoming part of the spin to legitimise regulating substances 
such as dioxin, where it has not been established with scientific certainty that 
such a substance is toxic to humans. Precaution as used in the PP means that 
one does not release a substance into the environment if there is uncertainty as to 
whether it will cause harm to humans and the environment. This is in contrast to 
the risk assessment approach where such a substance is released into the 
environment and then assessments of the risks it poses are developed. However, 
while the New Zealand Government's 'Environment 2010 Strategy' fully 
endorsed the PP as one of its 11 key principles, the PP is seen as being expensive 
and "very difficult to implement in practice" (ERMA, 2002: 10). So "in most 
New Zealand legislation and practice" the PP is watered down to the 
`precautionary approach' and is adopted within risk assessment (ERMA, 2002: 
10). It is argued by ERMA that this is a way of "achieving the same purpose 
without the formal 'baggage' associated with the Precautionary Principle" 
(ERMA, 2002: 10). The 'baggage' refers to fundamental values to do with 
society's expectations for environmental management and to sustainability that 
are embodied in the PP. This confusion allows for the adoption of a 
risk-assessment approach under the guise of being precautionary. This is at work 
in the dioxin issue as well as other issues in New Zealand, most notably GE 
(Ninnes, 2001, see also Scott and Tipene-Matua in this volume). 
The Ministry for the Environment (MfE) argues that it is taking a 
precautionary approach, yet it has developed a NES that allows some level of 
dioxin emissions to continue, and allows for the building of more incinerators. 
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The MfE Action Plan sees the NES as applying to municipal waste incinerators. As 
yet there are no such incinerators, but the MfE envisages these being built to 
burn refuse that would otherwise end up in landfills (MfE, 2001: 23). This 
means that a certain level of dioxin will still pollute the environment and end 
up in humans. This approach does not seem to be fulfilling the requirement 
that New Zealand signed up to in the Stockholm Convention, a point made 
forcibly in some of the public submissions to the Action Plan (Greenpeace, 
2002). 
Further, the action plan being developed following the signing of the 
Stockholm Convention takes no account of the dioxin contamination already 
present in the land. Both the Government and local councils "are deliberately 
obstructing the public release of details of thousands of locations known to be – 
or suspected of being – poisoned" (The New Zealand Herald, 24 February 2001). 
A report for the MfE identified 7,800 dioxin-contaminated sites, and noted that 
in some cases the damage done at these sites cannot be undone (MfE, 1997: 
14). Such secrecy undermines public participation in dealing with and solving 
this problem. It also undermines trust in elected representatives. 
From a personal communication with MfE senior analysts working on the 
dioxin action plan (14 February 2002), it appears that there is a difficulty with 
developing an action plan in isolation from wider issues to do with dioxin 
emissions. For example, how should the MfE deal with rural sector plastic 
waste disposal? Large amounts of plastic waste are produced on farms but 
cannot now be incinerated or buried. There is also concern that if a NES is to be 
developed for dioxin emission, what about a NES for other pollutants such as 
"PCBs, PCP, DDT and dieldrin" (MfE, 1997: 22)). The information to date is 
that the action plan has not been 'finalised'. 
Dioxin issues at the local level 
Dioxin is also of major concern at a local level. For example, a report by 
Sawmill Workers Against Poisons (SWAP) for the MfE detailed alarming 
statistics of what is claimed are chemically related illnesses affecting sawmill 
workers in Whakatane, Kawerau, Kinleith and Waipa (The New Zealand Herald, 26 
June 2002). But the most prominent example of local concern is the claims of 
dioxin contamination by residents at Paritutu from the Ivan Watkins Dow (IWD 
– now called Dow AgroSciences) chemical plant. The Dow Chemical Company 
is the largest chemical company in the United States, with factories in many 
countries and employing 50,000 people (The Dow Chemical Company, 2003). 
Dow AgroSciences is a wholly owned subsidiary of The Dow Chemical 
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Company and produces "pest management and biotechnology products" (Dow 
Agrosciences, 2003: 1). 
In 1960 the IWD chemical plant began manufacturing the herbicide 2, 4, 5-
T, along with other agricultural chemicals, in Paritutu, New Plymouth. For the 
next 27 years it continued to do so, producing TCDD as a byproduct. Due to 
increasing international concern over the health impacts of dioxin, especially 
TCDD, it stopped making 2,4,5-T in 1987. It was the last factory in the world 
to stop making the herbicide (The New Zealand Herald, 18 February 2001). 
By the 1980s local concerns about the effect of IWD emissions on the 
residents of Paritutu began to surface. But scientific studies (The Royal Society 
of New Zealand, 1980) of dioxin in this and other areas in New Zealand 
continued to claim that there were no health hazards caused by dioxin at the 
concentrations that were present. Pressure from residents continued and finally a 
Ministerial Committee of Enquiry was set up in 1986 – the Brinkman Inquiry 
(Brinkman, Matthews and Earl, 1986). It concluded that there was no 
substantiated evidence of ill effect on the health of the residents of Paritutu 
from the IWD manufacture of 2, 4, 5-T. One of its recommendations was, "that 
manufacture and use of 2,4,5-T continue for 12 months provided that the dioxin 
content in any new product manufactured after 30 June 1987 is reduced to 1 
ppb" (Ministry of Health, 2002: 12). 
In a supplementary report one year later they did state that environmental 
contamination in the area was widespread, and one of their recommendations 
was that in future all new chemical manufacturing plants should be situated in 
areas that are remote from residential areas (Brinkman, Matthews and Earl, 
1987). 
The above reports were made in 1986-7 and were based on recommended 
daily intake levels that have since been substantially reduced, as previously 
discussed. The science of dioxin and dioxin's toxicity were not as well 
understood as they are today. While the residents of Paritutu claimed that there 
was a relation between their illnesses and dioxin, they could not prove it on the 
paradigm of scientific evidence that was required. IWD has repeatedly denied 
that any emissions from its factory have posed an environmental or public 
health threat (The New Zealand Herald, 18 February 2001). In 1985 IWD 
stated, 'Studies have shown no lasting health effects from sometimes severe 
dioxin exposure' (IWD 1985: 13). Further to this they state: 'There are no 
known deaths from exposure to dioxin' (IWD 1985: 7). 
The Paritutu residents' organisation, Dioxin Investigation Network, 
continued to agitate for further inquiry into this issue and to have blood tests. 
Their claims were also voiced on TV and in the media (such as the Holmes 
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Show in 2000, 20/20 in 2001 and in The New Zealand Herald on a number of 
occasions during 2001 — see references). Recent epidemiological research on 
residents at Paritutu showing that they had a 30% increased risk of cancer was 
also coming to light (Kogevinas, Becher, Berntazzi et al., 1997). Finally, in 
2001, the Ministry for the Environment agreed to test the soil at Paritutu for 
dioxin levels and to investigate claims that IWD had dumped toxic chemicals in 
that area. The Ministry of Health agreed to test the blood of about 100 
residents in the area. The soil at 45 sites was tested and found to be contaminated (in 
the range of 5 to 15 ng/kg), but not at a level that posed a health risk. Only at one 
site was the contamination above acceptable guidelines — 92 ng/kg (The New 
Zealand Herald, 26 September 2002). The blood tests, which will show the 
level of dioxin in Paritutu residents' bodies, have not yet been completed. 
The difficulty with this testing is that it is 12 years since IWD stopped 
producing dioxin, and 30 years since the production of 2, 4, 5-T was at its peak. 
The levels in the soil and in the bodies of the residents in Paritutu will be 
considerably less than when the damage to residents is claimed to have 
happened — back in the 1960s and 1970s (The New Zealand Herald, 26 
September 2002). So unless other types of evidence are allowed to be included, the 
residents will never be able to scientifically prove the relation of their dioxin 
body burden and the illnesses they claim it produced. 
This case provides good support for the adoption of the precautionary 
principle. Given the growing scientific evidence of the toxicity of dioxin, the 
need for much more scientific research into the mechanisms by which it 
interferes with human development, and the concerns of the public who have all 
been exposed to dioxin, it would seem prudent to stop dioxin entering the 
environment. The precautionary principle can also be argued to be applicable to 
other areas of human activity such as genetic modification, and in particular to 
the conventional production of food, to which we now turn. 
Organic versus conventionally produced food 
The issue that arises here is whether the synthetic chemical residues found in 
conventionally produced food pose a risk to consumers. The organics movement 
argues that there is no safe level of chemical residue in food, and that we 
should move to the development of organic food production. The New Zealand 
Food Safety Authority (NZFSA) claims that as long as residues are below the 
stipulated 'maximum residue limits' (MRL) they pose no risk to human health. 
Let us turn our attention for the next few pages to the state of the scientific 
debate over such residues. 
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The question concerning residues nicely illustrates the first level challenge to 
science, that from within the scientific community itself, as there is much 
scientific debate as to whether such residues constitute a risk to human health. 
The testing to determine toxicity, usually whether the chemical in question is a 
human carcinogen, is by standard high-dose animal cancer tests. In these tests, 
rodents are given near-toxic doses of a particular chemical – the maximum 
tolerated dose (MTD). If cancer results, the chemical is seen as a rodent 
carcinogen and a likely human carcinogen. If the chemical does not produce 
cancer it is deemed safe for humans. 
However, scientists such as Ames and Gold (1999) have argued that 
high-dose animal experiments do not indicate that a particular chemical may be 
a human carcinogen. The carcinogenic effect is simply the result of the high 
dose, not the chemical. Ames and Gold argue that cancer risks to humans 
cannot be assessed by these standard high-dose tests, and suggest that if such 
tests are used to determine toxicity, many chemicals that naturally occur in 
foods are also carcinogenic. They argue that small residues of synthetic 
chemicals pose no risk to human health – it is the dose that makes the poison. 
This is disputed by other scientists who argue that there is considerable scientific 
evidence to show that low levels of residues can be just as much a threat to 
humans as high doses (Schreinemachers, 2000; Watts, 1994). There is also 
evidence – in addition to that obtained from high-dose animal experiments 
–that strongly suggests certain synthetic chemical residues in food for human 
consumption can cause serious health problems (Colborn, Myers and 
Dumanoski, 1996). Evidence from experiments using very low doses of 
synthetic chemicals has found that tiny doses of a chemical over long periods 
can be more harmful than larger doses, and that the timing of the low dose is 
very important. 
For example, Bisphenol A (BPA), a compound used in the manufacture of 
polycarbonate plastics used for food and beverage containers, leaves residues in 
that food and has been found to have significant adverse health effects. If very 
low doses of BPA are given to mice during the perinatal period it causes an error 
in cell division called aneuploidy that causes spontaneous miscarriages and birth 
defects. Low doses have a greater effect than high doses (Rubin, Murray, 
Damassa et al., 2001; Hunt, Koehler, Susiarjo et al., 2003). Given that 
current human exposure levels of BPA are the same as the levels delivered to the 
mice, this effect would be expected to be found in humans. Hunt et al. (2003) 
argue that current safe exposure levels of this compound need to be reevaluated. 
The scientific debate over the health effects of synthetic chemicals illustrates 
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certain difficulties. First, scientific research is open-ended – evidence is never 
indisputable (Callon, 1995:46). Second, the decision as to whether a synthetic 
chemical is or is not toxic tends to arise inter alia by a growing climate of 
scientific confidence, based on a collective enterprise related to the design and 
conduct of experiments, and agreement on results (Callon, 1995: 47). And 
third, it is very difficult to scientifically show a direct cause–effect relationship 
between a specific chemical residue and a negative human health effect. 
Scientific evidence and public trust 
The contested nature of scientific evidence can produce a 'scientific spin' where 
data contrary to the desired result is suppressed or eliminated from the reported 
results. This *evidence' is produced by scientists working for private companies in 
the commercial sector who produce these chemicals. More and more 
scientists are being employed and their research is specified and funded by 
organisations who expect them to come up with certain conclusions (Jasanoff, 
1990; Gieryn, 1995). This can paralyse regulatory agencies if they seek to 
regulate on the basis of scientific evidence, as it allows those who manufacture 
the chemicals to litigate endlessly against regulation. Fagin and Lavelle (1999) 
provide many examples of how this happens in the USA. 
For example, the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is inter alia 
concerned with regulating chemicals such as pesticides that are released into 
the environment. It relies on research carried out by the manufacturers, or for 
them, when it considers regulation of toxic chemicals. The manufacturers are 
required by law to provide the EPA with all this research. In 1991 and 1992 
the EPA offered an amnesty from hefty fines if manufacturers provided health 
studies that they should have handed over to the EPA earlier. 
Manufacturers suddenly produced more than 10,000 studies showing that 
chemicals already on the market could pose a "substantial risk of injury to 
health or to the environment" – the kind of never-published data that the 
law says must be presented to the government immediately (Fagin and 
Lavelle, 1999: 13-14). 
This sort of behaviour (corrupted science) undermines public trust in scientists 
who are not independent and the evidence they produce. In the UK, a recent 
survey of the public found that 'fewer than 14 per cent trusted what they hear 
from scientists working for private business or from the news media. 
Government scientists come somewhere in the middle (32 per cent)' (Economic 
and Social Research Council, 2002: 3). Another survey showed that 82 per 
78 Challenging Science 
cent of Britons trusted scientists working for environmental groups, while only 
47 per cent trusted those working for industry, and 48 per cent trusted 
government scientists (Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, 1995). 
A recent survey in New Zealand, showed that a significant proportion of 
the public distrust scientists. It found that 86% of people believe it is important to 
have some scientists who are not linked to business interests, and 83% believe it is 
important to have some scientists who are not linked to government (Hipkins et al., 
2002). This flies in the face of the neoliberal reform of scientific 
institutions in New Zealand, where there is pressure to develop science in 
partnership with business, and to direct research funding to the development of 
a 'knowledge economy'. There is not much room for independent scientific 
research in this approach, nor to scientific research geared to a set of priorities 
different from 'wealth creation'. 
Further limitations of scientific testing 
There are a number of other limitations to the scientific testing of synthetic 
chemicals. Until very recently there has been no testing of chemicals for other 
health effects such as endocrine and hormone disruption. There has been no 
testing for the effects of long-term exposure to chemical residues at doses lower 
than the MTD, and there has been no testing of chemicals in combinations, for their 
synergistic effect (Ninnes, 2001; MacGarvin, 1993; Zakrzewski, 1997). The 
limitations of scientific testing cast doubt on the adequacy of this science 
(toxicology) and epidemiology to deal with the questions of long-term exposure 
and synergistic effects. Yet it is these sciences that are predominantly used to 
decide on the risk of chemical residues to human health, because it 'is the best 
we have at present' (Zakrzewski, 1997: 105). 
This raises more general questions concerning what constitutes a scientific 
approach, how far we are able to assess risk using this paradigm, and what 
other evidence would be acceptable in assessing risk. Studies since the early 
1990s show how extremely small amounts of chemicals can interfere with 
the natural chemical messaging systems in humans (endocrine disruption). This 
may be about to cause a revolution in the scientific understanding of the impacts 
of contamination on health, and the studies point to the fact that our ability to 
synthesize chemicals has got far ahead of our scientific understanding of their 
impacts (Myers, 2002). The new science of toxicogenomics holds some 
promise that we will soon be able to understand how toxins affect the specific 
genes of our cells at low and high levels, and the long-term effects on genes of 
multiple toxins (Schmidt, 2003). But the enormous amount and 
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complexity of data that this approach will yield at the micro level does not 
necessarily translate into a coherent account of adverse effects of toxins on 
humans (Schmidt, 2003). 
The limitations of the risk-assessment approach are one of the reasons for 
the growing call for the adoption of the precautionary principle. If we consider 
what synthetic chemicals are in our food as residues, and the lack of scientific 
understanding as to their health effects on humans, then on the precautionary 
principle we should opt for organic food. How then are the chemicals used in 
food production regulated? 
Maximum residue limits 
In New Zealand, MRLs are set in accordance with the internationally accepted 
residue limits set by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex). Though 
the official mandate of Codex is 'to create a set of international standards to 
guide the world's growing food industry and to protect the health of consumers', 
in practice it often makes decisions that benefit profit and production at the 
expense of nutrition and health. This is because Codex is strongly influenced by 
'industry and biotech representatives' (Fagan and Wolfson, 1997). Watts argues 
that the Commission's aim is `to minimize disruptions in the food trade caused 
by the presence of pesticide residues in food' (Watts, 1994: 29). 
The MRL for a particular pesticide is set on the basis of the quantity of 
residue expected in a particular food relative to the amount of the pesticide 
required to kill the pest. So the MRL can vary depending on the food it is 
being applied to. The fungicide chlorothalonil's MRL varies from 5 mg/kg for 
some vegetables to 30 mg/kg for some fruits (Watts, 1994). The MRL 'refers to 
the maximum level of named contaminants in foods that can legally be sold for 
human consumption' (New Zealand Food Safety Authority, 2002: 1). The 
MRLs in New Zealand may vary from those set by Codex, because 'these 
limits are not usually established on purely health grounds' (New Zealand 
Food Safety Authority, 2002: 3). They also depend on the severity of the pest, 
and on facilitating trade. 
With the advent of pesticide-herbicide-resistant GE food, the MRLs will 
rise. 'Monsanto, the major manufacturer of glyphosate, has successfully applied to 
the European Economic Union to raise the maximum residue limit for 
glyphosate 200 times from 0.1mg/kg to 20 mg/kg. Similar standards have been 
set at Codex, the WHO/FAO food standards agency, and applied for in Australia 
and New Zealand' (Dibb, 2000: 5). The NZFSA states that any residue level 
`allowed in foods must not pose a human health risk' (NZFSA, 2002). But 
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given what has been said above, the risk assessment based on toxicological 
testing is limited in its ability to provide such assurance. 
Public access to information 
So how is the public to know whether the food they buy in the supermarket is 
safe? For a start there is no labelling of food to inform the public what chemical 
residues it contains. This, together with the continuing increase in food-borne 
illnesses, has led to growing public concern as to exactly what is in our food. As 
Annette King said in her speech to the Food Safety Conference (25 March 
2003), "In the seven years from 1990 to 1997 the reported incidence of 
food-borne illness almost doubled, and the trend since has continued upwards 
... 
Concerns about these trends were backed by increased consumer anxiety about 
exactly what was in the food they were eating. For example, there was increased 
concern about chemicals in food" (King, 2003). 
This is one reason for the creation of the NZFSA in 2002 and for the New 
Zealand Government's recent introduction of new food-labelling requirements. 
The new food labels will detail the nutritional content of the food, the percentage of 
main ingredients, the presence of potential allergens, and whether the food 
contains any genetically modified ingredients. But they will not include 
information on the residue levels of agricultural chemicals such as pesticides 
present in that food. 
Some very limited information on residues present in food is available – it is 
contained in the Ministry of Health's 'Total Diet Survey' (TDS). The last TDS 
was carried out in 1997/8. The TDSs provide a limited amount of information, in 
that they only test a selection of the foods available – the 'average' New Zealand 
diet – and they only test for a fraction of the chemicals used in food production. 
For example, glyphosate, the main ingredient in Roundup, is never tested for in 
New Zealand food because the process is expensive. Also excluded from testing are 
many herbicides used in New Zealand (Watts, 2000). The results of the survey show 
that most of the foods sampled were below the required MRLs. 
The TDS is not readily available to the general public, nor is the information in 
it easily accessible. No information is provided as to the possible health risks 
associated with these residues. The NZFSA and the Ministry of Health aim to 
make sure that our food is safe. But food scares overseas and here, and casual 
attitudes to food preparation and storage, have led the public to be wary about 
possible food contamination and the assurances of its safety by elected 
representatives. This is one reason for the increased concern by the public 
over food safety, and also for the increased demand for organic food. 
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Organic food 
Organic food is certified to be free of synthetic chemical residues, yet if one 
looks at the way organic food is presented in the supermarket and in the media 
there is no information as to the health benefits of eating food uncontaminated 
with these residues. This makes it difficult for the public to decide whether 
organic food production should be encouraged by the Government, and what the 
benefits of eating it might be. The debate over organic versus conventionally 
produced food is conducted in publicity from organic organisations such as Soil 
and Health, Bio-Gro, Greenpeace and the Green Party on the one hand, and 
from those such as Ames and Gould (1999) who argue that conventionally 
produced food is perfectly safe, and that regulations concerning residue levels 
should be abandoned. 
The demand for organic food has grown rapidly, with horticultural 
production experiencing a 'silent revolution' (Campbell, 2000), and the interest in 
organics is moving very much into the mainstream. Farming newspapers (Rural 
News, Straight Furrow, Country-Wide) now carry features on organic food 
production and on conversion to organics, and National Field Days are 
highlighting the development of organic farming. 
But the huge growth in demand for organic products and the discourse that 
surrounds the organics industry is now primarily focused on financial results, not 
health or the environment. Large companies such as Fonterra (2003), Zespri 
International, Heinz-Watties, McCains and ENZA have now entered organics, 
seeing financial gains to be made in the export market. For example, Zespri 
now produces kiwifruit for export that are organic or grown with reduced levels of 
spray (Integrated Pest Management), after New Zealand kiwifruit was rejected 
for exceeding the MRLs in Europe. According to the Organic Products Exporters 
of New Zealand (OPENZ), New Zealand's organic exports were $70 million in 
2000/2001, and the industry predicts organic export sales will grow to $500 
million in the next four years (OPENZ, 2002), with domestic sales of $150 
million . 
With this growth in organic exports and with an overseas demand that far 
outweighs New Zealand's ability to supply (USDA 2002), one would expect the 
New Zealand Government to finance research and development 
programmes, educate the public as to the process and benefits, and provide 
incentives for going organic. There is much research needed to examine whether 
organic fanning is more sustainable than conventional farming in producing for 
world markets. There are also many problems with converting to organics and 
with organic certification requirements that need to be addressed. 
While other countries such as the UK provide assistance and subsidies to 
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farmers converting to organics, the New Zealand Government has, up until 
very recently, not fully supported this industry (Martech, 2003: 26). The 
government provided only $250,000 for organic farming in the 2001 Budget 
—being only 0.8% of the $30 million of extra funding to be spent on agriculture 
and biosecurity over the next four years. 
However, a recent report contracted by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry outlines an organic sector strategy for New Zealand that seems set to 
improve government support for organics. This strategy, fully endorsed by 
Minister for Agriculture Jim Sutton, aims at "a target of $1 billion total sector 
sales by 2013" (Martech, 2003: i). The strategy will require the Government to 
provide funding of $2 million per year for five years (Martech, 2003: 45). 
While things seem set to improve for the organics sector, the predominant 
spin from the Government has been about catching the knowledge wave and 
developing biotechnology. This was clearly stated by the Minister for 
Agriculture at the launch of a new joint venture between a biotechnology 
company, ViaLactia, and Livestock Improvement, where he said this 
development 'demonstrated the rural sector's grasp of what was required in a 
knowledge society' (Sutton, 2002). 
The market for organics overseas is seen as a temporary phenomenon 
generated by 'food scares such as BSE, E.Coli, listeria and consumer opposition to 
genetic modification' (USDA, 2002). Once the overseas consumer has got over 
the scare, they will return to food produced by conventional or genetically 
engineered means. It will supposedly be cheaper, and the return to the producer 
higher. Biotechnology will also create wealth, as expressed in the current Labour 
Government's concern 'to catch the knowledge wave' and to develop a 
`knowledge economy'. There is not much room for organics here! 
Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at two issues that have generated considerable public 
debate. In each the interrelation between science, public participation and spin 
has been discussed. While each issue has themes that are specific to that issue, 
there are common dimensions. 
The way scientific information is selectively disseminated to the public, 
the issues of access to information and the way submissions from the public 
over these issues have been dealt with show a pattern. The risks to human 
health and the environment have in each case been presented by the government as 
under control, based on scientific evidence and government regulation. 
Concerns of the public that fall outside science, or are not based on the current 
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paradigm of scientific evidence, are not seen as relevant to the issue. But the 
science of risk assessment based on toxicological research has been shown to 
be inadequate in assessing risk, and claims to the contrary have led to public 
distrust of scientists and elected representatives, and concern over health and 
environment issues. The inability of science to determine health risks in relation 
to dioxin and pesticide residues in food, and the fact that much science is 
conducted for commercial or governmental interests, has also contributed to 
this distrust. 
Another element common to these two issues is the way language was 
employed to obfuscate what were previously clear concerns. This was illustrated 
with the spin over precaution, and the way this term was 'loosened' to mean 
caution. This was further illustrated with 'total diet surveys' that were not total 
and with the labelling of food so consumers could make 'informed' choices 
while leaving out information on toxic residues in food. 
Surveys of the public have suggested that people have concerns over these 
issues, which are not simply about science and wealth creation. They are also 
about what sort of society the public want, and whether certain suggested 
developments may not be in the best interests of society. The democratic process 
requires that these concerns are really discussed and not spun out of view. 
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